

HELENA FLAM
Universität Leipzig
Institut für Soziologie
ORCID: 0000-0003-1429-0355

Sociology in Denial: Praising Love, Ignoring Hate

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Sometimes a little accident leads to significant sociological insights. In this case it consisted in a very much appreciated invitation to contribute to a special issue on hate to be published by “Przegląd Historyczny”. Ever since I have been racking my brains for sociologists or sociological debates on hate. Until today the only positive outcome of the process is a single name: Georg Simmel, one of the founding fathers of sociology. He actually wrote a few pages on the topic. These I will present at the end of this text.

As a way of introducing my article, I will next shortly comment on the contemporary sociological discourses, pinpointing several concepts recurring in these discourses which skirt the issue of hate. I will then briefly present some well-known concerns of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber to substantiate my claim that they showed little interest in hate. Ironically, as much as various dictators and conservatives hated sociology for its critical and disruptive potential, its predominant Durkheim-derived Parsonian version which became widespread after World War II praised solidaristic society and its integrative forms. It made no room for considering the role of hatred and hostility, except at its margins.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL DISCOURSES

Let me take a random text. It is random, since it appeared on the screen of my smart phone this morning and I could not but read it. Yet, it was not selected for analysis by pure whim. It is a well-written, high quality piece of scientific research, offering many interesting insights and theses. It deals with sport rivalries and racism, so one would think that if sociology had anything to say about hatred, it would be taken up in this very article. The author is Peter Millward. The article is entitled, “Rival-

ries and Racisms: ‘Closed’ and ‘Open’ Islamophobic Dispositions Amongst Football Supporters”. The text was published by *Sociological Research Online* 13.6 in 2008.

As I will now show the word hate does not appear in the said article. Instead in the Abstract the competing football teams and their fans have “feelings of rivalry towards each other,” in the opening paragraph of the Introduction (1.1) the fans chanting a song labelling the rival football star a “terrorist bomber” commit an act of “abuse” and Islamophobia, and the first sentence opening the actual article (2.1) asserts that “football grounds have. . . provided an arena in which prejudiced values have prospered” — the text goes on to name anti-Semitism and Islamophobia as examples of such prejudice. The title of this particular article part is also indicative: “Football, Racism and Religious Intolerance”. It draws attention to the role of the press stereotypes in deepening national rivalries and prejudice, and more generally to the disfiguring, deprecating jokes in expressing anti-Asian, anti-Islam and anti-Black prejudice. Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism are mentioned almost in one breath, without explaining the vital difference — phobia stands for chronic ungrounded anxiety, while racism stands for long term hatred. Phobias are often cured.

I could go on in the same vein, but I think my point is already clear. Instead of facing the horror of cold yet constantly ablaze hatred and its multifaceted expressions, we are invited to deal with rivalry which sings a song of chivalry, and think of football as merely ugly tainted by prejudice and intolerance. Not the hatred of, contempt for, and wish to annihilate the other as a representative of an imagined collective (racism) is stressed, but instead the other-blaming neurotic anxiety said to be provoked by the otherness of the other (phobia).

It is an important point, so I make it in a separate, well-visible paragraph: it is worth emphasizing that this slide away from hatred is certainly not the intention I attribute to the author. He means to discuss both, but against his intentions remains captured by a mainstream discourse.

Let me take a quick and therefore oversimplifying look at another area of studies to make a similar point. Also in this area of study one would expect the word hatred at least occasionally to show up. But when mainstream sociology deals with hatred directed against migrants and minorities, it falls back on a very similar vocabulary to the one I just teased out from the article on sport rivalries and racism. It often draws on Georg Simmel’s concept of the “stranger” when it lumps together the settled minorities and the newcomers into a single category. This is contrary to Simmel’s intention — he focused on a stranger who came to stay. From the point of view of the mainstream, whether societal or sociological, the newcomers and the long settled minorities are both “foreign” — a foreign element in the body of society and politics. The hope they both will disappear never seems to die! That is what makes the concept so attractive in the first place.

Mainstream sociology addresses facing the “stranger” in terms of individualized experiences, such as, for example, fear or anxiety felt when meeting a stranger

(example: Islamophobia in English, islamophobie in French, *Fremdenangst* or *Fremdenphobie* in German). Interestingly, in German the word *Fremdenfeindlichkeit* (see also: *Ausländerfeindlichkeit*) is linked to xenophobia or *Fremdenphobie* and consequently does not merely speak of hostility (*Feindlichkeit*) towards strangers but carries with it a self-justifying explanation for this hostility — anxiety about or fear of strangers, and of any dissimilarity they display compared to one's own ways. Not to be forgotten: to the family of related words belongs also *Überfremdung* or the feeling that one is overpowered or overwhelmed by (anxiety- and fear-provoking, hostility-evoking) strangers and their strangeness.

Even more often, mainstream sociology addresses *individual prejudice* and negative *individual attitudes* felt towards strangers. If addressing group phenomena at all, mainstream sociology aggregates prejudice and negative attitudes towards “strangers” with the help of surveys.¹ After computing survey outcomes, it presents statistical outcomes which report on the *distribution* of these anxieties or negative attitudes in society and, by the same token, about its degree of anxiety about and (in)tolerance towards “strangers”. Alternatively, it speaks of a natural tendency towards animosity, competition and frictions between the established and the newcomer groups — even Norbert Elias and John Scotson (1994) made themselves guilty in this respect. They naturalized (or, if one wishes to put it differently, made a sociological rule out of) this animosity and these frictions as the very title of their book — *The Established and the Outsiders* — indicates. In this they echoed the Chicago School of Sociology just like a major German sociologist, Hartmut Esser (1996), did.

Those who confront hatred as a collective, structured and organized phenomenon are relegated to and, when located at less prestigious universities, marginalized in, for example, Racist and Neo-Colonial Studies, Minority or, more recently, Gender Studies. These sub-disciplines draw attention to and analyze historical conditions which gave rise to the phenomenon itself and its placement on the academic agenda. They pinpoint the relevant power asymmetries and economic relations in specific societies, and explore how these shaped the past and still nurture the present socialization processes which have encouraged feeling hatred directed towards specific groups in and beyond a given society. They zero in on the various forms of mobilizing and expressing hatred orchestrated by the organized opponents of migrants and minorities, and, more recently as an autonomous area of study, women.

Upon some reflection, I have to admit that my remarks reflect best the situation in the German mainstream sociology. Some of the pioneering studies of discrimination dating back to the late 1960s, addressed also racial hatred or saw as their predecessors in such authors as Frantz Fanon who analyzed it in detail. But most took pains to conceptualize, explain and document structural and institutional discrimination. In the US already in the late 1970s discrimination of African-Americans

¹ For critique see, for example, FLAM et al. 2007, pp. 110–132, 235–257.

and women was put on the sociological agenda in structural and institutional terms.² British sociology followed, while in France Pierre Bourdieu and his many collaborators developed their own approach to the topic — unique for France was the focus on the discrimination of the working-class children in and by the educational system (this particular focus was of interest to pedagogues in Germany who adapted Bourdieu's and Passeron's arguments about the role of educational institutions in reproducing class *and* gender structures of inequality to Germany). In Germany the first *sociological* study of school discrimination, the so-called Bielefeld Study, came out in 2002,³ followed by an EU-funded study.⁴ This novel, comparative EU-funded project included taking a look at the racist and anti-minority discourses, including expressions of pure hatred, even among such newcomers to this study object as Austria, Cyprus, Italy, Poland or Sweden.⁵ Since about 2006, when under the EU pressure Germany finally passed its first anti-discrimination laws, the concept itself started its slow and laborious way into the sociological and societal discourse.

So far I have argued that contemporary Western sociology has very little to say about hatred. This leads to the question of why this is so. Next I will take a brief look at three classics of Western Sociology to answer this question. It is perhaps important to signal at the outset that it is not because they did not pay any attention to emotions. They did. But not to hatred.

LOOKING FOR HATRED IN CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY

Starting with the French father of sociology, Auguste Comte, one can say that he focused on the love of the members of society to each other as the proper topic of sociology. He imagined men-philosophers taking care of policy decisions, answering the question of in which direction development should move. For women he reserved the most important task of nurturing love of the members of society for each other and for society at large. His student, Emile Durkheim, used the word solidarity much more often than love in his books,⁶ but the major thrust of his argument remained true to Comte's agenda. Solidarity was his main focus. Durkheim investigated the influence of very many factors on the ability of society to sustain this love or solidarity, and until today we remain indebted to him for his exploration of the role of various institutions — familial, religious and military — for sustaining or undermining solidarity.

² FEAGIN, FEAGIN 1978.

³ GOMOLLA, RADTKE 2002.

⁴ FLAM et al 2007, but also see various texts by a predecessor in the area of discrimination, Thomas Faist.

⁵ DELANTY, WODAK, JONES 2011.

⁶ FLAM 2002, pp. 61–88.

If Durkheim addresses hatred, then to the best of my knowledge only when discussing elementary forms of solidarity, in societies based on the principle of similarity in their forms of labor, consciousness and morality. In such societies a loss, whether of property, limb or life, calls for an absolute equivalent loss. Thus acts of property appropriation and limb or life destruction are justified. At the base of this call is the feeling of hatred and a quest for revenge, both extremely primitive to Durkheim's eyes. In law this is known as a *lex talionis* principle — a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye. Durkheim's no doubt normative argument is that more developed societies left this principle behind and act mostly upon law that calls for restitutive justice and solidarity.

The only other place where hatred might be found is in his Second Foreword to *Division of Labour in Society* (1902). In it he discusses and rejects a number of institutions as incapable of helping achieve the state of societal solidarity. He possibly mentions not just class animosity but actually class hatred when arguing that only corporations (occupation-based associations) would be capable of laying strong institutional foundations for societal solidarity. These associations would accompany the individuals from the cradle to the grave, know their members' interests, dreams, needs and worldviews, and thus would be best equipped to represent them in decision-making bodies concerned with the welfare of all in which all such occupation-based associations would be gathered. Durkheim argued that they even would be capable of dealing with the most sensitive place of constant frictions and conflicts — that between classes.

Max Weber is probably the most appreciated until today for his essays on the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* and his typology of forms of domination. He is even today paraded as a firm believer in rationality and a rational-bureaucratic organization of the state, although he is also as often cited as the very sociologist who regretted (what he described as) the gradual disenchantment of the world and the conversion of a human being into a mere cog in a bureaucratic machinery — both caused by the very processes of rationalization. Weber's typology of social action is also often brought in to support the view that he defined emotional action as unsuitable for sociological analysis, although he explicitly identifies *expressive* emotional action as such.

As various re-readings of Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* in the past decades revealed,⁷ in this analysis of several Protestant sects he often addressed the role of various emotions and showed how they interlaced in different ways with their doctrines and religious practices. So for Lutheranism he identified a state of openness to emotions and, for example, remorse as crucial to following the doctrine and experiencing religious feelings as a form of connection to the divine. According to Weber, in contrast to Luther, Calvin hated all kinds of emotionality.⁸

⁷ FLAM 2002, pp. 44–51.

⁸ BARBALET 2000.

This hatred made his doctrine so insistent on the rational and systematic pursuit of God on Earth. Still: Weber discovered long term anxiety about one's individual chances of salvation, driven to a state of frenzy by Calvin himself, at the base of Calvinism. In sum: Weber referred to Calvin's hatred of emotionality, but hatred is no object of analysis otherwise.

Also if we cast a look at Weber's ideal types of domination — traditional, charismatic and rational-bureaucratic — we will find various emotions, but with a couple of exceptions, not hate.⁹ For all forms of domination (legitimate power exercise) it is important that they swing between the two emotional poles of fear and loyalty. Those subject to power obey their rulers because they feel loyal towards them and fear the consequences of not following their orders and instructions. In addition, each type of domination features another set of supporting emotions. Charismatic rulers enjoy the love, awe and devotion of their immediate followers, and also of the masses. But these are conditional upon these rulers' ability to rule wisely and perform miracles. If they fail, awe, love and devotion disappear and, here we come across a single mention of hate, might turn into hatred. Weber-scholars note that Weber was particularly impressed by the passion of the Jewish prophets, and wrote about the vehemence with which they attacked the greedy, the corrupt, and the lenient multi-god believers. Weber did see their passion and vehemence as the base of their rationalizing reforms. Thus, if we translate vehemence into hatred and hostility, we can say that in this context he did recognize their importance — but it is a matter of interpretation. The traditional rule is supported by emotions vested in the tradition as such as well as in traditional rules and practices, and by respect and awe felt for the rulers. Finally, the rational-bureaucratic rule gains additional support from hope about ever progressing life chances (read: bureaucratic career) made possible by one's diligent display of faithfulness to the rules and regulations its top-level decision-makers want implemented. Also this extremely brief summary of Weber's notes on the role of emotions in sustaining different forms of domination shows that Weber did not have much to say about hatred in this particular context. Possibly when re-reading his remarks on the problem of succession and conflicts ensuing after the death of a charismatic leader among his followers, one would come across some remarks on the role of hatred in these conflicts.

Interesting to note is that both in the case of Calvin and of the ancient Jewish prophets Weber sees hatred as a source of a rationalizing impulse, although Calvin's hatred is directed against all forms of emotionality (especially of the Lutheran variety) and that of the ancient Jewish prophets against lenient believers. Perhaps this in itself is an interesting research line to follow.

This amounts to saying that two important classics of the European Sociology, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, had virtually nothing to say about hatred. But this conclusion should be checked and re-checked, based as it is on the findings

⁹ FLAM 2002, pp. 56–60.

of the Sociology of Emotions which sought to prove that they paid attention to emotions but did not specifically look for their writings on hatred. Still they did not lay a foundation for the sociology of hatred as Georg Simmel did. On the contrary. Durkheim's main concern was that with the sociology of institutional integration and societal solidarity, while Weber's scientific project was to explain the leading role of the Occident in a worldwide evolution and its paving the way for a disenchanting, bureaucratized future, punctuated by occasional bursts of charisma.

I have so far argued that neither Durkheim nor Weber paid attention to hatred and that it was by no means because they excluded all emotions from their study of society. Durkheim's focus was on solidarity and both Durkheim and Weber included an entire plethora of emotions into their analyses. If one steps back it is truly surprising that neither paid attention to hatred because their major works appeared during the times of emancipation and intense class struggles as well as conflicts about the role of minorities, especially Jews, in their societies, and during the escalation of the French-German animosities, leading to World War I.

The same could be said about the Parsonian sociology which became dominant just after World War II. As older introductory texts to sociology remind us: Parsonian sociology played down skewed distribution of economic and political power as well as the conflict and power struggles resulting from this skewed distribution. It did not just present, but heralded a harmonious view of society supported by shared values and norms. As a result of the US world dominance and due to many US stipend-holders returning after their studies to their home countries, this type of sociology became taught also in some European, Scandinavian and Asian countries. It helped, as it were, in the post-war re-construction and re-integration process without paying any attention to the topic of war or hatred the war engendered and was engendered by.

The voices of the critics of Parsonian sociology could be heard first in the 1960s in the context of post-colonial struggles. These critics wanted to discuss asymmetrical power relations, skewed distribution of life chances and resources as well as conflicts and power struggles this gave rise to — in organizations, society and the world. Some turned to Georg Simmel in search for theory that would provide an alternative to that offered by Parsonians.

ON SIMMEL'S SOCIOLOGY OF HATRED

The only classic of sociology to address hatred was Georg Simmel. In his essay *Der Streit*, which can be translated as the fight or the conflict, he reflects upon the sources of hatred and how it can be best handled to be transformed from destructive to productive. Simmel approaches the sources of hatred in two different ways — he locates its source in other emotions but also in a relationship between the two parties to a hate-filled conflict, whereby the second point of departure can be interpreted in terms of yet other emotions which give rise to hate.

As far as other emotions are concerned, Simmel points out that jealousy, envy and ill-will or resentment are the typical sources of hate.¹⁰ Jealousy and envy are about achieving what another has and keeps us from achieving — for that we can ultimately come to hate this person:

Jealousy [*Eifersucht*] stands for an unfulfilled wish to enjoy the love (or friendship or sympathy or attention) of a person who bestows it on another person who is understood as an undeserving competitor for this love. The competitor is understood as a hindrance to achieving the state of reciprocated love to which one feels one is entitled. The sense of entitlement can stem from a feeling that one is equal or better than the competitor and thus deserves the love (or friendship or sympathy or attention) of which one is deprived by this other. The competitor rather than the object of love becomes an all-consuming focus of attention. Out of jealousy hatred can develop. Indeed, under specific conditions (see below), in jealousy many feelings — love and hatred, anger and cruelty — mix.

Envy [*Neid*] is another likely source of hatred. Envy stands for a wish to possess what the other possesses. Much more than jealousy it is focused on the coveted characteristics or possessions rather than the person who possesses them. In envy there is no sense of entitlement, but instead obsessive desire to possess reins — one envies somebody's fame without having accomplished any heroic deeds. Also in this case the distance from envy to hatred is short. Both jealousy and envy are recurring, biting, bitter.

Ill-will or resentment [*Missgunst*] stands for desiring an object just because the other possesses it. The feeling is, however, more focused on the other and not wishing the other well than on what the other possesses. At its core it grows out of a destructive feeling towards the other, a wish to destroy his or her enjoyment of a possession justified by a feeling that this person does not deserve his or her joy. Destroying the object of desire just to cause pain to its owner is quite possible in this constellation. Again, ill-will or resentment are associated with bitterness and hatred.

Jealousy in a perceived unity: in a specific case of jealousy which is openly shown and leads to a conflict, the jealous person makes a claim to the unity-creating mutual (yet denied) love. In this case jealousy is particularly intensely associated with love *and* hatred, anger *and* cruelty. It is unclear whether addressing it Simmel contradicts what he said earlier about jealousy or claims a different dynamic for this specific case of jealousy openly carried out — at any rate, he says that a *conflict* which develops out of jealousy is not based on a sense of entitlement but on a pure desire to possess the person and her or his love (friendship, sympathy, attention). The jealous person attaches him- or herself to the desired, yet no longer existing unity of the couple with all his / her obsessions, phantasies, hatred and anger, even when this unity no longer exists. It is this postulated unity — the very intense feeling of belonging together — that legitimates the demand on the other's love or friendship

¹⁰ FLAM 2002, pp. 26–33; SIMMEL 1999, pp. 282–323.

and such like, but also legitimates all the other contradictory emotions such as love, hate, contempt and anger. According to Simmel, often the object of all these feelings recognizes the legitimacy of the claim to love (friendship, sympathy, attention) but rejects the demand for unity. This deepens then the feelings of love and hate, deepest bitterness, emotional self-deceptions, appeals to the sense of obligation of the other, the clinging to each perceived sign of (love-)feeling, etc. These feelings and these interactions then are the characteristics of a conflict carried out in the name of love.

At this point it is appropriate to point out that Simmel saw all emotions as a cement of society. Even such emotions as jealousy, envy or hatred, as Simmel shows, connect individuals to each other.¹¹ Simmel contrasted in particular hatred, but by implication all the other emotional states, with indifference. A society, he believed, is tied together by the multitude of emotions crisscrossing it and connecting its members to each other. Indifference in contrast would eliminate any semblance of society. Only unconnected individuals would remain. Further, in contrast to many of his contemporaries, Simmel saw conflict as productive under specific circumstances. He saw it as part and parcel of a modern society in which individuation and articulation of interests went hand in hand, without destroying the fabric of society.

For the particular case of jealousy carried out in a form of an open conflict, he argued that its properties show best how a conflict (or conflicting parties) simultaneously strive(s) for the destruction *and* reproduction of a unit(y). With this claim Simmel makes yet another argument about the destructive-reproductive role of emotions in society — even if they fuel conflicts, they serve to connect and orient various parts of society to each other, but — and this is his key point — they do so best when they are subject to regulation. To illustrate this, from his discussion of jealousy Simmel then moves on to discuss different forms of competition as its derivatives and at the same time regulators — in some forms of competition, winning over the rival is enough to secure victory (marathon, boxing). In others, it is necessary to go one step further and also win the object of desire (in love it is necessary to also gain the love of the woman, while in commerce it is also necessary to gain the satisfaction of a customer). By implication: even such seemingly destructive feelings as jealousy and envy can become productive, if subject to regulation.

Skipping Simmel's long reflections on the constructive aspects of conflict and its regulation, let me move to his remarks on hatred and the positive aspects of its regulation. As in the case of jealousy, he points out that in general hatred and conflicts are deepest — most divisive and destructive — when the parties to a conflict perceive themselves as part of a unit(y), as similar in all other respects but that which constitutes the issue of contention. The hatred, but also the pain of disunity of the otherwise belonging together / of the otherwise united, is the greatest. This goes for hatred and pain of the conflicting parties when they stem from

¹¹ SIMMEL 1955; FLAM 1990; FLAM 2002, pp. 15–26.

the same family, community, association, political party, etc. and neither wants to abandon the position they hold for fear of the consequences of what the other conflict party will do, if left unopposed. It is the worry about the welfare of the shared object of concern — the family, association, political party or the nation-state — which makes the hatred and the conflict so intense, and, simultaneously, makes it so difficult for the conflict parties to quit and thus leave the welfare of the shared object of concern in the hands of the other.

Simmel comments that the fact that the parties to a conflict openly express their opposing views about a certain issue is in and of itself positive — this way they air their differences and define their positions in relationship to each other. Each thus defines its identity sharper and better. This is to be treated as a positive process of articulation and individuation not just of the conflict parties but also of the society.

Yet, if left free to rein, a conflict about an issue gives rise to many tumultuous emotions, increasing the risk of aggression and violence. To avoid this, it is necessary to introduce rules for how to carry out the conflict, starting with an obligation to show each other respect. Once the rules are in place, the issue can be discussed with more neutrality and logic, and the destructive emotions can be pushed back.

One of Simmel's examples for a constructive conflict regulation is the conflict between the capitalists and workers. He says that once this conflict became subject to scientific analysis and thus more "matter-of-fact" (as in German Marxism or British trade unionism) and the work-related issues became turned into a subject which can be managed by courts, the requirements for a peaceful conflict regulation became fulfilled. Employers became defined as subject to profit pressures rather than perceived as exploitative, merciless bloodsuckers. And workers were no longer accused of hatred and envy. Instead their class interest in better working conditions and higher wages became recognized. The very substance or matter of the conflict became foregrounded and the de-escalation of the conflict — the relegation of the personal and emotional to the background — became possible.

This short and incomplete exposition of Simmel's ideas on hatred and its regulation should suffice to convey the view that he was the only classic of sociology who discussed hatred at any length. It also shows how he embedded his remarks on hatred in his analysis of emotions in general and conflict in particular. A systematic study would be called for to reveal what else he had to say on the topic in *Der Streit* and his numerous other essays. Here it should be added that he constituted an exception to the rule not only as compared to Durkheim and Weber, his fellow sociologists, but also in the German society of his time. German unification took place first in 1871. The ideal of a unified and harmonic German society held many minds in its grip. Not Simmel's. A similar constellation was in place in the US and Europe after World War II. Simmel's *The Stranger* but not Simmel's *Der Streit* was read. Instead Parsonian harmony-stressing sociology reined supreme.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this short text I tried to argue that sociology has been in denial about the importance of hatred in social life. I did so first by pinpointing how the sociology of sports which wishes to address racism and racial hatred is caught in “sociologues” preventing it. I then turned to mainstream sociology to point out that it often speaks of prejudice, various minority- and migrant-related phobias, and negative attitudes towards foreigners/minorities rather than addressing the problem of hate directed against migrants and minorities. I finally pointed out that, if at all, special area studies, such as Post-Colonial, Racism or Gender Studies, and anti-discrimination studies sometimes do.

In the part of the text devoted to classical sociology, I showed that Durkheim had very little to say about hatred, although he focused his research on societal love or solidarity and thus did not leave emotions out. Similarly, Weber did not ignore emotions. His research focused on the Occidental civilizational accomplishments, such as, for example, legal-bureaucratic administration, whose very existence depends crucially on the two (emotional) poles of obedience — loyalty and fear. As more recent research shows, he made himself guilty not of biological but of cultural racism as well as cultural imperialism — and thus of contempt, if not of hatred, of other “races” to which he counted the Poles as much as the Chinese. But in his most well-known, academic writings he did not confront these emotions.¹²

It is Georg Simmel to whose texts we have to turn to find some rudimentary reflections on hatred, conflict and conflict regulation. In the last part of this article I showed that he derived hatred from his analysis of other feelings, such as jealousy, envy and ill-will or resentment, on the one hand, and discussed hatred (just as jealousy) as a prime source of conflict, on the other. I underscored that in Simmel’s view emotions, including hatred, are part and parcel of society and can play a constructive role if they help the processes of interest articulation and of open engagement in a conflict. Especially if the emerging conflicts become subject to regulation demanding respect for both conflict parties, detached-analytical recognition of their antagonistic interests, attention to the matter at hand and following the procedural rules for conflict resolution, they stand a good chance of strengthening rather than weakening the social bonds.

Admittedly, this article only skimmed the surface. It focused on a few classics of Western Sociology and on the mainstream contemporary sociological discourses, only mentioning but not analyzing the Racist, Postcolonial and Gender Studies. Broadening the perspective to include more founding fathers (and mothers) of sociology would fill in the gap just as looking beyond its limits. It would be interesting to find out whether W.E.B. DuBois, African American classical sociologist, or Govind Sadashiv Ghurye, the father of sociology in India, included emotions and in particular hatred into their analyses. Did the very first generation of Polish sociologists

¹² BARBALET 2022; ZIMMERMAN 2006.

(Ludwik Gumplowicz, Leon Petrażycki, Edward Abramowski or Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz) or Polish sociologists who became famous also in English-speaking countries, such as Florian Znaniecki or Bronisław Malinowski, pay attention to hate? If not, an obvious question to pose and answer is: why did they not? If yes, why did they as opposed to their Western European or US counterparts pay attention to hate?

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Summary

I argue that mainstream sociology has long denied the existence of hatred in society. Apart from Georg Simmel, the classics of sociology paid very little attention to hatred, even though, as recent developments in the sociology of emotions show, they paid considerable attention to emotions. The trend was continued with the spread of Parsonian sociology to Europe, Scandinavia and Asia after the Second World War. As the opening pages show, even today mainstream sociological discourses and surveys tend to skirt the matter. It is only on the margins, in research on discrimination and in gender, racism or post-colonial studies that we might find references to hatred, although even these seek legitimacy by analysing structures and institutions rather than hate discourses and hateful minds. This is in part due to the sociological heritage, also known as the cult of ancestors: a quick overview of well-known classical texts shows that Emile Durkheim implied or mentioned hatred when addressing revenge in simpler societies and hatred between the working and the capitalist classes in more complex, industrial societies. Max Weber underscored the role of fear and loyalty in sustaining the relations of domination. He also noticed Calvin's hatred of all kinds of emotionality, especially one he attributed to Lutheranism. But it was Georg Simmel who defined hatred and related it to envy, jealousy, resentment and other emotions. In contrast to the intellectual trends of his time, he pinpointed positive effects of hatred, effects such as promoting individual and societal articulation, and, if regulated, advancing healthy competition and innovation.

